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Abstract
As an alternative to current wired-based networks, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are becoming
an increasingly compelling platform for engineering structural health monitoring (SHM) due to relatively
low-cost, easy installation, and so forth. However, there is still an unaddressed challenge: the application-
specific dependability in terms of sensor fault detection and tolerance. The dependability is also affected
by a reduction on the quality of monitoring when mitigating WSN constrains (e.g., limited energy, narrow
bandwidth). We address these by designing a dependable distributed WSN framework for SHM (called
DependSHM) and then examining its ability to cope with sensor faults and constraints. We find evidence
that faulty sensors can corrupt results of a health event (e.g., damage) in a structural system without
being detected. More specifically, we bring attention to an undiscovered yet interesting fact, i.e., the
real measured signals introduced by one or more faulty sensors may cause an undamaged location to be
identified as damaged (false positive) or a damaged location as undamaged (false negative) diagnosis.
This can be caused by faults in sensor bonding, precision degradation, amplification gain, bias, drift,
noise, and so forth. In DependSHM, we present a distributed automated algorithm to detect such types
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2of faults, and we offer an online signal reconstruction algorithm to recover from the wrong diagnosis.
Through comprehensive simulations and a WSN prototype system implementation, we evaluate the
effectiveness of DependSHM.
Index Terms
Wireless sensor networks, structural health monitoring, dependability, fault detection, fault-tolerance,
energy-efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) consist of a number of sensor nodes that can collaborate
with each other to perform monitoring tasks. WSNs have been widely deployed on the ground,
vehicles, structures, and the like for enabling various applications, e.g., target detection, scientific
observation, safety-related, and traffic monitoring [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]. A WSN
typically consists of a large number of resource-limited sensor nodes working in a self-organizing
and distributed manner. Sensor nodes Applications of WSNs include military sensing, wildlife
tracking, traffic surveillance, health care, environment monitoring. Recent work has explored
that WSNs can be a compelling platform for engineering structural health monitoring (SHM),
due to relatively low-cost, easy installation, and so forth [9], [10], [11], [12], [13]. In a typical
SHM system, the interest is in monitoring possible changes (e.g., damage, crack, corrosion) on
physical structures (e.g., aerospace vehicles, buildings, bridges, nuclear plants, etc.) and providing
an “alert” at an early stage to reduce safety-risk. This prevails throughout the aerospace, civil,
structural, or mechanical (ACSM) engineering communities.
Both ACSM and computer science (CS) communities have already addressed numerous chal-
lenges/requirements, including data acquisition, compression, aggregation, damage detection,
distributed computing. However, there is still an unaddressed challenge: the application-specific
dependability, which is the ability of a WSN providing application-specific meaningful monitor-
ing results under sensor faults. Particularly, such a system should be able to detect the sensor data
faults online and take recovery actions immediately to avoid meaningless monitoring operations.
In fact, dependability is highly desired in a WSN-based SHM, as an “alert” about a structural
event conveys a serious concern with public safety and economic losses.
On the one hand, SHM algorithms in wired sensor networks used by ACSM are generally
3centralized/global-based [11], [14], [15], [16], in which they may not need to seriously consider
data collection quality and synchronization errors, etc. This is because they may not often handle
data losses or mismatch, as there are no issues like poor wireless connectivity, narrow bandwidth,
and energy constraints. The dependability is affected by a reduction on the quality of data when
mitigating the constraints. Moreover, once data from the WSN is collected at a centralized base
station (BS), it becomes complex to scrutinize all the collected data (including faulty signals).
On the other hand, significant efforts have been made for specific fault types in WSNs
[17], [18]. Some prominent schemes, namely, decision fusion (or 0/1 decision), threshold-based
decision, heartbeat reception have been suggested for fault-tolerant phenomenon (such as an
event) detection problems [17], [19], [20], [21], [22]. These often use simplified data and few
measurements to adequately detect certain faults. However, they are not able to function properly
in an SHM system, since SHM algorithms use totally different methods to detect a damage event.
For example, the algorithms need raw measured signals rather than the decision fusion, and the
analysis of signals (vibration, strain, damping, etc.) that requires a substantial knowledge from
ACSM domains (e.g., finite element model updating, Eigen matrix, mode shape properties) [23],
[13], [10], [24]. We have evidence from experimental settings that when there is a change in
structural health properties (as shown Fig. 1a), 0/1 decision schemes tell sensor 5 is faulty, but
they cannot tell what happen (faulty signals or damage event) around sensors 4 and 6. Regarding
all these issues above, a question might be posed: is it possible to have a dependable SHM system
using WSNs?
The answer is positive. In this paper, we design a dependable and distributed WSN frame-
work for SHM (called DependSHM) that jointly considers ACSM and CS requirements. In
DependSHM, we propose an algorithm to detect sensor faults efficiently under the constraints
of the WSN. Dependability in WSNs suffers from various types of faults, including, transceiver
failure, link errors, security attacks (e.g., collusion), etc [18], [25]. Numerous efforts are being
published every day in handling these fault types. Instead, we are interested in some types of
sensor faults that are common but difficult to identify: sensor debonding (when a sensor partially
or completely debonds from the host structure), faulty signals, faults in offset, bias, precision
degradation, and the amplification gain factor of signals, noise faults, node missing or failure.
Most of the sensor data faults fall within these fault models and they directly interrupt a
WSN system from detecting damage. Sensors with some of these faults seem to work properly,
4Fig. 1. Investigation of the dependability performance of different schemes in structural health monitoring (SHM).
to communicate to neighbors, to exchange heartbeats, but they return incorrect readings or
decisions. Under any of the fault occurrences in a practical SHM, we discover a fact that goes to
SHM system dependability: both faulty and non-faulty sensors can generate abnormal signals or
decisions (i.e., remarkable changes in the measured signals). The difficult part is that sensor data,
the only available information, will be affected by both structural damage and sensor faults. We
further discover an interesting fact that such a possibility can cause an undamaged location to
be identified as damaged (false positive) or a damaged location can be given undamaged (false
negative) diagnosis. When we transform these false positive and negative rates into a structural
health event detection ability as the performance of system dependability (as shown in Fig. 1b),
we find that those decision based and current SHM schemes do not perform well.
We use a new general measurement, mutual information independence (MII), between two
signals u and v from two different sensors for evaluating results in the absence of the ground
truth. We think that mutual statistical information can be used as an indicator to decide on a
sensor fault detection in conjunction with damage detection. We attempt to reconstruct faulty
sensor signals using Kalman filter techniques so that if there is damage, it can be recovered after
the reconstruction. This does not require any costly actions, including sensor grouping, faulty
sensor avoiding, masking, isolating, or replacing.
Our major contributions in this paper are as follows:
• We study a WSN-based SHM system dependability problem and design DependSHM to
address the problem. This task is by no means easy, as it requires multi-domain knowledge
and is associated with optimizing WSN resource constraints.
5• We propose a non-faulty data collection algorithm, by which we utilize an online faulty
sensor detection algorithm based on the function of MII. Although we focus on sensor
faulty signals in DependSHM, MII does not rely on a particular fault type.
• In DependSHM, we present a recovery algorithm to reconstruct faulty sensor signals based
on the Kalman filter technique. The recovery is directly applicable to any kind of spatially
and temporally correlated signals that are caused by numerous sensor faults in a WSN-based
SHM system.
• We evaluate DependSHM via simulations using real data sets, adopted from a SHM system
deployed on the GNTVT structure [26]. We implement a prototype system developed by
the TinyOS [27] running on the Imote2, and verify it on a test structure. The results show
that a careful use of recovery from faulty signals in DependSHM is effective and can lead
to a dependable WSN-based SHM system.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related Work. Section 3 provides system
models and problem formulation. Section 4 presents the DependSHM framework. The faulty
sensor detection algorithm is in Section 5. Faulty sensor signal reconstruction is detailed in
Section 6. Performance evaluation is outlined in Section 7. Section 8 concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Dependability in WSN-based SHM. WSNs have been widely suggested and validated in
experimentation for SHM system by both the ACSM and CS communities in recent years [10],
[11], [13], [14], [15], [24], [9], [28]. Existing schemes already have sufficient contributions to
ACSM and CS requirements [2], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [24], [29], [30], [31],
[32], [32], but they suffer from the dependability problem.
On the one hand, generally data can be corrupted at four stages, namely acquisition, processing
and local decisions, wireless transmission, and the final analysis at the BS. Among them, the
most important stage is the acquisition stage that can ensure the quality of sensor readings in
WSNs at the beginning. The quality is also affected when application-specific requirements are
considered, including high-resolution data, raw data, non-faulty data, dependable and real-time
decision-making to analyze actual structural health conditions. These additional requirements are
traditionally guaranteed by using wired networks. To make WSNs effective alternatives to wired
network system instruments, a first step in this direction is SHM system dependability in terms
6of detection of faulty sensor readings and a collection of non-faulty readings at the BS, and then
dependable monitoring results. In this paper, we take such a step.
Work from Generic WSN Applications Related to SHM Dependability. Fault tolerance in
WSNs has been studied extensively by researchers in computer science [17], [19], [20], [13], [33],
[20], [22]. The application background is largely event/target detection in battlefield surveillance,
environment monitoring, etc. The general objective is that when some sensor nodes give faulty
readings, how to achieve the correct detection of an event/target over a specific region. Among
them, a large part of the schemes on fault detection are off-line and centralized-based. Most
schemes rely on various detection methods, including correlation analysis, 0/1 decision, value
fusion, decision rules or threshold. Some more details can be found in our earlier work [20],
[9], [33], [22].
Although dependability support by fault detection and tolerance problem in SHM looks similar
to the problem of making binary “0/1” detection decisions or value fusions [9], [20], [21], it is
fundamentally different from them. To check the validity of this assumption and the dependability,
we have conducted WSN-based SHM experiments on a physical structure (the settings are
described in the later part). For these experiments, faulty signals are injected into sensor nodes
to validate the systems capabilities to autonomously detect and tolerate the fault. As shown in
Fig. 1, these schemes do not show a satisfactory performance in SHM; specifically, they cannot
identify what exactly occurs in a WSN-based SHM. We can see that when there is a change
in structural health properties (as shown Fig. 1a, a 0/1 decision scheme [21] tells sensor 5 is
faulty, but it cannot tell what happens (faulty signals or damage event) around sensors 4 and 6.
There are also changes in signals of sensors 5 and 6. Those existing schemes show here a high
rate of fault positive and false negative rates, resulting in a low system dependability. When we
consider WSN-based system dependability as the structural health detection ability, we can see
that these schemes show low dependability performance, as shown in Fig. 1b. The methods of
detecting faulty sensors by measured signals, removing faulty signals from the measured signals,
and then identifying what happens exactly in a structure are different from the methods in those
schemes.
Numerous techniques towards the area of fault detection and isolation (FDI) have been
proposed, e.g., model-based techniques, knowledge-based techniques, or a combination of both
[34]. There are also techniques on fault-tolerant data aggregation that deal with faulty sensor
7readings caused by security attacks, such as node compromising, collusion [18], [25]. They use
some filtering algorithms (e.g., iterative filtering) at the upper-stream nodes (e.g., cluster head)
to remove the faulty signals. Though the algorithms seem to be applicable for our case, we could
not justify them. However, it may be difficult to apply such filtering algorithms at a upper-stream
node once such a high-resolution big acceleration data from a number of nodes reaches at a
upper-stream node and the upper-stream node filters all the raw data. Various constraints in
WSNs and application requirements might be an issue in them.
Work from SHM Applications Related to SHM Dependability. On the contrary, there
are also fault detection schemes from ACSM engineering domains [35], [36], [37], [38]. The
concepts in most of them are associated with system failure detection dating back to the 1980s.
Here, the failure does not imply to faults in a WSN system, but to faults (e.g., damage) in
a physical systems. FDI concepts (described previously) have also been implemented in a
number of engineering disciplines, such as ACSM, to improve the availability and reliability of
SHM systems [38]. However, these are centralized and computationally-intensive, and usually
developed in wired networks.
A noteworthy WSN deployment method for SHM applications called SPEM [16]. SPEM
nicely explains the ACSM and CS requirements and is verified on the real structure. It adjusts
the quality of sensor locations to better fit WSN requirements; meanwhile, the adjustment satisfy
ACSM location-quality requirements. We have verified SPEM under sensor faults in simulations
and found that the SHM dependability performance in SPEM drastically decreases from 87% to
28% as the number of sensors in the WSN increases, as shown in Fig. 1b. This is just because
of a lack of the dependability support.
To the best of our knowledge, as the first step, we have worked towards the WSN-based SHM
application-specific dependability, and have got preliminary results [9], [33]; and this paper is an
extension. Our first work is about sensor fault detection algorithm and structural damage event
in WSN-based SHM [33] that works on Natural Frequency extraction and Matching in Clusters
(NFMC for short), and then tackles faulty sensor readings. However, it has several shortcomings,
described in [9]. After improving the shortcomings, we check the dependability performance by
NFMC, as shown in Fig. 1b. Its dependability performance falls between 96% and 76%, which
is much better than all other schemes. However, such a performance is still not enough to put
our confidence in a WSN-based SHM system.
8As an extension, this paper includes several aspects. (i) We deal with the problem of SHM
system dependability and design DependSHM for the problem. (ii) We propose a WSN frame-
work to observe the dependability by removing faulty sensor data from structural damage data
and by finding a fault indicator based on MII. To ensure the dependability, we devise a new
method for tolerance to a missing or failed sensor. We then address the challenge of when both
structural damage and sensor fault occur at the same time, and identify what exactly happens
in a structure. Generally, it is not easy to make sure that there is a faulty sensor but there
is no damage. Particularly, we attempt to make DependSHM efficient for recovery from the
sensor faults that occur for a short duration; thus, masking or isolating the sensor (as required
in NFMC) is not needed. (iii) For the faulty sensor, we present a process flow of the Kalman
filter and a graphical representation of it for the signal reconstruction. (iv) The motivation for the
dependability, clarifications on system models, and SHM-specific terms are given. (v) A detailed
performance evaluation and new results are presented.
III. MODELS AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we provide some necessary models and definitions. Then, we formally formu-
late our problem.
A. Network Model
We assume that a set P of m wireless sensors is in charge of performing different types of
application tasks (e.g., sensing the vibration, strain, and damping signals, pressure, temperature,
etc., in the context of SHM) and sending its measurements to neighboring nodes. A reference 2D
building model is shown in Fig. 2a, where sensors (white circle) are deployed on it and a remote
monitoring center or BS station location (colored circle) is at a remote place. Fig. 2b shows the
traditional WSN framework for SHM (which is similar to the framework in [16]), while Fig. 2c
shows the proposed distributed, dependable WSN-based SHM framework, DependSHM.
Consider that the set of sensors is deployed on a structure by finding locations from a set
of candidate locations of the structure; L = {l0, l1, l2, · · · , lm}, where sensor i is placed at
location li, and l0 is a suitable location of the BS. For high-quality monitoring results, we follow
engineering-driven sensor deployment method [13], [16], [39], [40]. Regarding DependSHM in
Fig. 2c, sensor i can be allowed to acquire data, analyze it locally (prepare natural frequency
9Fig. 2. WSN-based SHM frameworks.
if needed), identify faulty readings, and finally compute mode shapes locally or transmit the
non-faulty raw data to the BS (see Appendix B for the natural frequency and mode shape
definitions).
Let Rmax and Rmin be the maximum and minimum communication ranges of a sensor,
respectively. Rmin is used to maintain local topology, where a number of sensors is allowed to
share their signals with their neighbors for damage detection, also used for fault detection. The
intention of adopting adjustable communication range is to reduce energy cost for transmission.
Note that Imote2 sensor platform supports discrete power levels [41]. Two local topologies can
be seen in Fig. 3; each sensor can be overlapped by one or more sensors. When a sensor
communicates to the BS directly, Rmax is used. Each sensor corresponds to a vertex in a
network graph denoted by G, and two vertices are connected in G if their corresponding sensors
communicate directly. The graph G is called the communication graph of this WSN.
B. Sensor Faults
1) Fault Model: We focus on the following set of sensor faults that occur in a real WSN-based
SHM system:
• Sensor debonding—it is a very common fault in a WSN-based SHM that occurs when a
wireless sensor slightly or completely debonds/detaches from the host structure. This affect
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is seen in terms of accurate vibration capturing from the structural response.
• Faulty signals—these are caused by precision degradation, breakage, etc., especially in
vibration signal capturing. For example, a sensor reports a constant value for a large number
of successive samples, where the constant value is either very high or very low compared
to the “normal” or “reference” value.
• There are faults in offset, bias, and the amplification gain factor of signals. For example,
the offset fault is due to calibration errors in sensor signals, which differs from the normal
value by a constant amount, but the sensor readings still exhibit normal patterns.
• Noise faults are caused by longer duration noisy readings that affect a number of successive
samples.
• There is also node missing or failure.
Sensors with these faults seem to work properly (except for the last type), to communicate to
neighbors and exchange messages, but they return incorrect values or decisions. We tackle these
faults in DependSHM.
2) Fault Detection Model: We assume that sensor i exchanges its signals with its neighbors
in each sampling instant t in Td, where Td is the monitoring round, i.e., the time is divided into
discrete sampling periods. In each period, i broadcasts its current readings to one-hop neighboring
nodes using Rmin. Besides the readings, i may be enabled to make a decision locally or recover
the mode shape and forwarded it to the BS. The signal yti measured by a faulty sensor at t is
subject to noise effect σ. Then, let y be the measured output reading that would be transmitted
to the neighboring nodes, which is given as follows:
y = yti + σ (1)
The measurement noise, σ, for non-faulty sensors may be a small random noise in practice.
However, it also can greatly affect damage event detection. Consider that a subset N of sensors
is non-faulty at time t. In SHM, when all of the sensors are non-faulty, it is easily possible
to estimate the mode shape from the signals. However, if a sensor is faulty, it is possible to
produce predicted signals for the mode shape by using neighbors’ signals, correlation statistics,
and the extent of σ. Suppose that damage may occur at time t, anywhere in the structure. A
subset D ⊂ P of sensors around the damage area is possibly able to detect the damage. Some
of the sensors from D may provide faulty signals. Thus, to detect faulty sensors, the sensors in
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D split into two further subsets:
N= sensors assumed to be non-faulty
F = sensors assumed to be faulty
Note that these two sets are disjoint so that
N ∩ F = {} and N ∪ F = D, where D ⊂ P
Generally, sensors anywhere in the WSN can be faulty/failed. However, we put an emphasis
on continuous monitoring and on those sensors whose signal have changed significantly (due to
a fault/damage).
Definition 1 [MII: Mutual Information Independence]. A function denoted by ω() is defined
by the quantify of how much the measurement correlation between sensor nodes in N and sensor
nodes in F deviate from the correlation model.
We state the MII function as an indirect vibration signal measurement. Assume that a prior
correlation model C of xtP presents [42]. C can be given as a reference set by all immediately-
stored data in the sensor local memory after WSN system initialization. The MII function between
two signals of sensors i and j at time t in D, is given as follows.
ω(yi, yj, C) (2)
Consider that the sensors in N and F capture vibration signals and broadcast their measured
signal sets yN and yF , respectively. Thus, MII between the two sets of signals of N and F is
given as follows:
ω(yN , yF , C) (3)
Given R consecutive signals, the MII function estimates the correlation between yN and yF at
time t as:
∆(N,F ) =
R∑
t=1
ω(yN , yN , C)−
R∑
t=1
ω(yF , yN , C) (4)
∆(N,F ) is achieved by reducing the deviation between non-faulty sensors in N , and by max-
imizing the deviation between non-faulty sensors in N and faulty sensors in F . D can be
controlled by the system user considering Rmin, neighborhood size, or network density.
12
Fig. 3. Topologies with different numbers of overlapping sensors in different neighborhoods.
C. Energy Cost Model (cost(ei))
One important objective is to minimize the energy cost of the network. Let cost(ei) denote the
total energy cost of sensor i, including measurement, computation, transmission, and overhead.
Consider a shortest path routing model [13], [16]; there is a path from sensor i to neighboring
sensor node or the BS j: q = z0, z1 . . . zk. Sensor i propagates the data to them. We can find the
ith hop sensor on each path and calculate the amount of traffic that passes along on the paths
within each round of monitoring data collection (Td, d=1,2,. . . , n). Then, the cost(ei) can be
decomposed into the following four parts:
cost(ei) = eT + ecomp + esamp + eoh (5)
Here, i) eT is the maximum energy cost for data transmission over a link between a transmitter
and a receiver. ii) ecomp is the energy cost for processing data locally, e.g., computing equation
(6). iii) esamp is the energy required for a sampling cost of M data points [33], [43]. iv) eoh is
the additional overhead for some causes, e.g., fault detection, signal reconstruction, copying data
to a local buffer, and network latency. See Appendix A for an extended version of the energy
cost model.
D. Problem Statement
Given: a set P of m sensors and a BS, which are deployed over a physical structure and
are involved in monitoring structural health that is reported to the BS.
Find: a subset D (⊂ P ) of sensors that involves in detecting structural damage event such
that the sensors in N(⊆ D) are non-faulty and the sensors in F = D −N are faulty, subjected
to the following constraints:
• Data delivery: ∀q = z0 . . . zk used for data delivery, where q[j − 1]q[j] ≤ Rmax, j = 1 . . . k;
• Connectivity: ∀i = 1 . . .m, ∃q = z0 . . . zk, q[0] = li, q[k] = l0;
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• Structural modeling.
Objectives: minimize ∆(N,F ) and minimize cost(ei), and maximize dependable mode shape
computation.
IV. DEPENDSHM FRAMEWORK
In this section, we present DependSHM, the dependable WSN-based SHM framework. It
is divided into three stages: distributed framework for structural health event detection (e.g.,
damage, crack, corrosion), faulty sensor detection, and faulty reading reconstruction.
A. Basics of Structural Event Detection Algorithm
The central focus of SHM is the detection and localization of events (considering damage)
within various types of structures. Generally speaking, SHM techniques rely on measuring
structural responses to ambient vibrations or forced excitation. Ambient vibrations can be caused
by earthquakes, wind, passing vehicles, or forced vibrations, or can be delivered by hydraulic
or piezoelectric shakers. It can also caused by a damage occurrence.
A variety of sensors, e.g., accelerometers, strain gauges, or displacement can be used to
measure structural responses. SHM techniques infer the existence and location of damage by
detecting differences in local or global structural responses before/after a damage occurs. The
responses are usually comprised of frequencies in the tens of Hz, and can be sensed using rela-
tively inexpensive low-noise MEMS-based accelerometers. Increasingly, the ACSM communities
are becoming interested in active sensing techniques [10], which measure structural responses
to forced excitations. In order to identify the damage, two necessary structural characteristics
are important: mode shape (Φ) and natural frequency (f ).
B. Mode Shape Computation at Each Sensor
Each type of structure (aircraft, building, bridge, etc.) has a tendency to vibrate with much
larger amplitude at some frequencies than others. f and Φ rely on structural material properties,
geometry, and assembly of its constituent members. We use state space model, which is widely
accepted by ACSM communities for capturing structural dynamics to compute Φ [23], [10].
We mention the process we use for Φ computation, which is the same process is used for
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designing faulty signal reconstruction (after fault detection). The state space matrices for a finite-
dimensional linear structural dynamic system can be succinctly obtained by the linear differential
equation:
Mx¨ +Kx+ σ = F (x, t) (6)
Here, function F (x, t) is the response of the structure over a period of interest at certain
sensor locations, where x is the structural response at time instant t. M and K are the matrices
of mass and stiffness coefficients of the various elements of the structure, respectively3. σ is the
signal to noise. In (6), damping is neglected for an advantage in detection (see Appendix C for
details).
In traditional SHM algorithms, the state space model is computed in a centralized/global
fashion. We argue that it could be quite costly for the resource-limited WSN. Considering SHM
as a big data application, to make use of the WSN for SHM, we mitigate this problem by
allowing each sensor to work only with local structural responses rather than the global. For this
purpose, We modify the model, considering the implementation of the model for each sensor
location. To reduce the system order, a transformation of the state space into mode coordinates
is necessary. This transformation is derived by determining a diagonal matrix, which contains
a certain number of Eigen frequencies covering the natural frequency ranges of interest. By
applying the mode transformation, based on the mass normalization {φi}, the refined Φ is given
by:
x = Φh (7)
where h is the mode participation factor. We have,
h¨i + δihi = Hi (8)
(7) implies the refined response of the structure that is a sum of the responses in each mode.
We can express it more explicitly as follows:
x =
n∑
i=1
hiφi (9)
where δi is the ith eigenvalue, and Hi = φTi f is the ith mode of responses under force or
ambient excitation input. The summation is given over all of the n modes of the structure that
15
Fig. 4. Providing the dependability in the WSN Framework: the step by step process of sensor fault tolerance and damage
detection.
are measured by the individual sensor. Typically, only the lower modes are important because
the force excitation is concentrated in these modes. Each sensor extracts its local Φ that can be
used for both faulty signals and damage event detection. The method of extraction, including
the difference between f and Φ can be found in Appendix B.
Is it Possible to Compute Φ under Sensor Faults: In practice, Φ is greatly affected by a faulty
sensor signals (see Appendix B for more detail), especially when a sensor is placed at a optimal
location [13], [16]. If a signal is detected as faulty, the measured signal is reconstructed directly
for the actual mode shape, by collecting the signals from the sensor location or reference signals.
We use neighboring sensor nodes’ signals for detecting a faulty sensor and reconstruct its signal.
In this work, not all the sensors’ signals using (6) will be measured. The measured output of a
sensor i at time t, yti , can be obtained by:
yti = Qx (10)
where Q is the measurement matrix.
C. General Overview of DependSHM
Fig. 4 summarizes the whole WSN framework for SHM. Once the WSN starts operating,
in each monitoring round (Td), a number of signals is measured at each sensor. Based on the
16
measured signals, each sensor identifies faulty sensors by using MII. If any faulty sensor is
detected, the neighboring sensors reconstruct the signals, while a faulty sensor itself can do the
same task if it still works. It is highly possible that a sensor exhibits faulty behavior temporarily
in many cases. However, if a sensor fails or it is missing from its location, we still guarantee
the signal reconstruction for the sensor. We do not assume to isolate or deploy a new sensor as
it is a costly task doing so.
In addition, for the high-quality SHM, we must provide monitoring information of each sensor
location, since ACSM communities mostly deploy sensors at optimal locations [13], [16]. Each
sensor locally computes the final Φ and transmits to the BS directly, which is a relatively small
amount of data. The BS assembles all the received final Φs and identifies the structural damage.
There is a high possibility that the BS does not receive any of Φ caused by data packet-loss
or others. If sensor forwarding fails, the BS still has the final results received through the
neighboring sensor nodes. In addition, we allow each sensor to keep the final results in the local
memory until a sensor receives an acknowledgment from the BS. Each set of raw Φ is of a
number of KBs while each final result or Φ computed by a sensor is a number of bytes. In this
framework, each final Φ received from the neighbors is not processed.
V. FAULTY SENSOR DETECTION
This section describes non-faulty sensor data collection and faulty sensor detection algorithms,
according to the model described earlier.
A. Data Collection and Faulty Sensor Indication
We assume that sensors are likely to generate abnormal signals. The signals are measured by
the vibration, which may be incorrect compared to the neighbors, previous signals, or reference
signals. We first show data collection at every sensor in the WSN. A subset of sensors, say D
of sensors that are in a sensor’s Rmin, share their data with each other, and participate in faulty
sensor detection.
Algorithm 1 simply presents the data collection method based on the neighborhood. While
theoretically this procedure involves multi-hop communication, consider the fact that for SHM
application, the radio communication range of current sensor nodes exceeds the area in which
sensors gather signals. We limit sensors to communicate within the one-hop neighboring nodes.
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Algorithm 1: Non-faulty Data Collection for Damage Detection
Input: a neighborhood with a bounded degree,
t←− transmission at a time slot
Step1: for i = 1 to m do:
node i acquires data and buffers it
Step2: i transmits its data to its neighboring node j
for t = 1 to n do:
for each node i do:
If i has data not forwarded to j then
transmits a new data to its j in t
Step3: call Algorithm 2
Step4: data aggregation (extracting frequency sets, compute Φk)
compute final Φ
Step5: transmit the final Φ toward the BS
return health status of every sensor location
We think that multi-hop communication is not mature enough. The nodes that are one-hop
away from the BS will directly send the data; otherwise, the data is sent through one or
more intermediate nodes. In Step1 of Algorithm 1, every sensor acquires signals captured from
vibration responses of the structure, and buffer them temporarily. Then, it transmits and receives
the measured signals. The sensors check if there are any faulty sensors, i.e., a sensor with faulty
signals via Step2.
Step3 executes Algorithm 2. When a remarkable change appears in a sensor’s signals, there is a
possibility that a sensor is faulty. The MII is used to detect faults. Let us consider the statistical
dependency between the two sensors’ signals quantified by MII. ω measures the information
about one sensor that is shared by another sensor in the set of signals in D. It is seen that ω
changes as soon as a sensor fault occurs, because the faulty signal is not present in the reference
or other sensor signals.
We use a joint Gaussian distribution based correlation model. Multivariate Gaussian distri-
bution has been used to accurately model the correlation of many types of signals in literature
[22]. Each signal is broadcast to sensors in D, where ith sensor signal yti ∈ ytD and jth sensor
signal ytj ∈ ytD, i, j ∈ D and D ⊂ P . For simplicity, yti as u and ytj as v are denoted hereafter.
Hence, it would be worth considering how to find joint probability density between two signals.
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The statistical dependency/independency between the two Gaussian distributed time signals u
and v can be expressed in the form of the joint probability density p(u, v) of signals:
p(u, v) = 1
2piτuτv
√
1−ρuv e−
1
2(1−ρ2
uv
)[(
u−µu
τ2u
)2
− 2ρuv
(u−µu)(v−µv )
τuτv
+
(
v−µv
τ2v
)2] (11)
where µu, µv, τu, and τv are the means and the standard deviations of the signals u and v,
respectively. ρuv is the correlation coefficient between the two signals. It is given by:
ρuv =
E {(u− µx)(v − µy)}
τuτv
(12)
The correlation coefficient can also sometimes be used to determine if two signals are statistically
independent. On one hand, if |ρuv| = 1, there is a strong correlation between the two signals. On
the other hand, if |ρuv| = 0, the two signals are not correlated. The correlation can be interpreted
as a weak form of statistical dependency. In [20], it is shown that two random variables, which
are not correlated, can even so be statistically dependent. This is why we take the statistical
dependency or independency. The product of the marginal densities ρu and ρv of the signals u
and v, respectively, is given by:
p(u, v) = p(u)p(v) (13)
If the expression in (11) is equal to the product of the marginal densities in (13), the signals
are completely independent. One possibility to quantify the statistical dependency between two
signals is to calculate the MII of them, as follows:
ω(u, v, C) =
∫ ∫
p(u, v) log
p(u, v)
p(u)p(v)
du dv (14)
The base of the logarithm determines the units in which information is measured. (14) shows
that if u and v are independent, ω becomes zero. A forward approach is to divide the range of u
and v into finite bins and to count the number of sampled pairs of ho = (uo, vo), o = 1, 2, · · · , n,
falling into these finite bins. This count allows for approximately determining the probabilities,
replacing (15) by the finite sum:
ωbin(u, v, C) =
∑
a,b
puv(a, b) log
pu,v(a, b)
pu(a)pv(b)
(15)
where pu(a) ≈ nu(a)/n and pu(b) ≈ nu(b)/n are the probabilities based on the number of
points nu(a) and nv(b) falling into the ath bin of u and the bth bin of v, respectively. The joint
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probability is puv(a, b) ≈ n(a, b)/n based on the number n(a, b) of points falling into box nos.
a, b. MII is non-negative and symmetric:
ω(u, v, C) = ω(v, u, C) ≥ 0 (16)
The MII for all possible combinations of sensor outputs yr and ys (except r = s, i = 1, 2, · · · , r, j =
1, 2, · · · , s) is computed, which leads to an ω-matrix for all combinations of r and s. The basic
idea is that the MII changes when a sensor fault fr is present. Suppose that it is in the rth
channel or index:
y˜r = yr + fr (17)
This fault appears only in the rth channel. Thus, we should expect that all combinations with
index r should show a reduction of ω. This allows us to localize the faulty sensor. One or more
faulty sensors can be simultaneously detected in the same way. One possibility to visualize the
faulty sensor is to use the relative change as a sensor fault indicator λωyr :
λωyr =
|ωyr − ωref |
ωyr
(18)
where yr is an actual data set and the lower index ref is one reference data set. The method
based on MII is able to detect sensor faults in different combinations of them.
B. Algorithm 2: Faulty Sensor Detection
Under centralized detection, the BS handles the damage and faulty sensor detection process.
In each decision cycle, the BS makes a decision about the faulty sensors, solely based on the
k most recent signals received from each sensor. The BS computes the MII for each signal,
and chooses the signal with the maximal independence for fault detection. This detection is not
suitable for resource-constrained WSNs. For example, if each sensor needs to send all its signals
to the BS (where each sequence of signals or raw natural frequencies can be from X0kb to
X000kb, X = 1, 2, . . .), the centralized WSN may not be able to operate for a given period of
time. In a large-scale WSN deployment, the situation becomes serious. After capturing data at
high frequency in SHM, sensors should reduce data before transmission.
In contrast, the faulty sensor detection (see Algorithm 2) can execute in a distributed manner
where each sensor makes a decision on the collected signals locally, as described earlier. In
the algorithm, if the local decision on a sensor’s signals, λωyr > 0.5, the sensor is faulty. This
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Algorithm 2: Distributed Faulty Sensor Detection
Decision: (λωnr ≤ 0.5: non-faulty), (λωnr > 0.5: faulty)
for each sensor i ∈ N where N ⊆ D do:
//set initial decision as a uniform distribution
(λωnr )i ←− 0 // each sensor i is non-faulty
loop
for each sensor i do:
(λωnr )j(neighbor) ←− receive neighbor jth decision
samples ←− N samples from (λωnr )j(neighbor)
for each sample h do: // h is an index
Rh ←− non-faulty sensors
Fh ←− faulty sensors
fh ←− (Rh, Fh) //Eq. 3
for each sensor i do:
if λωnr > 0.5 then
i marks/reports itself as a faulty sensor node
if i does not transmit the decision then
j marks/reports about i as a faulty sensor node
call Algorithm 3 // ith sensor signal reconstruction
end
means that MII is high on the sensor’s measured signals. The distributed method only requires
neighbors to be synchronized. In addition, the detection is almost immediate and online, since
a sensor does not need to wait for the signals from sensor nodes at more than one hop away.
Moreover, the detected faulty signal set is not forwarded toward the BS; thus, the communication
cost is relatively low. The energy cost becomes lower.
MII does not rely on particular fault types. The algorithm 2 based on MII is able to detect
different kinds of faults (as modeled before). However, it may fail to detect a node missing or
failing. We provide Appendix E for handling the node failure or node missing.
VI. FAULTY SIGNAL RECONSTRUCTION
In this section, we propose a Kalman Filter technique (KF) for faulty wireless sensor’s signal
reconstruction. The KF has received extensive attention to describe the recursive solutions of
predicting state variables for linear systems [44]. We consider it, as it can generate the best
estimation if the optimal filter is linear among all the linear observers, because it minimizes the
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Fig. 5. Sensor signal process flow under the KF.
error covariance. In ACMS engineering domains, the KF has been studied for on-line damage
detection [29]. Here, we utilize it for faulty sensor signal detection.
A. Kalman Filter in State Space Representation
The description of KF is made with the help of the state-space representation of the structural
system, as described in Section 4.2. One radical concept of the KF is that the state estimation
is recursively corrected by the actual physical system outputs. Then, using (6), the equation of
motion for time discrete and time invariant cases are given as follows:
lt = Mt−1zt−1 +Kt−1ut + σt−1
mt = Mtzt +Ktut + σt
(19)
ut is the excitation at a specific frequency at time t. Mt and Kt are transition matrices. The signals
σt−1 and σt represent the measurement noises, respectively (refer to Fig. D in Appendix D for the
state-space equation-based KF). When measuring the responses of a dynamical structural system
by sensors, the actual signals produced by the sensors are contaminated by noise due to internal
manufacturing defects, physical interference, or external environmental effects. According to
features of the KF, we assume that every measurement from the wireless sensors contains noise;
thus, if the noise measurement is zero, the KF collapses. Setting the mean of noise as zero is
a common practice: E[σt] = 0. Noises are assumed to be independent of each other, and are
normally distributed with covariance matrices, cv = [σσT ].
The underlying KF information is that KF is a recursive algorithm consisting of a loop (see
Fig. D ) which is passed through for each time instant t. The estimation of the system state for
t is determined from the weighted average of the actual measured value at time instant t and
the prediction of the system states for this time instant. The weight factors of this average are
determined from estimated uncertainties in each loop, which are also connected to the predicted
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system state and to the new measured value. The lower the uncertainty, the higher is the weight
factor; i.e., Kalman gain (Kt). The uncertainty is calculated with the help of covariance matrices
[45].
We shortly describe the faulty signal reconstruction process. At first a priori state estimate Pk
for the state vector lprt of the system are estimated [45]:
lprt = Mt−1zt−1 +Kt−1ut
Pk = Mt−1zt−1M
T
t−1
+ cv
(20)
After getting the measured value lprt , a posteriori state can be estimated in the correction step, see
(21). For the posteriori estimation, the difference between the measured and estimated signals
are weighted by the Kalman gain factor Kk.
lpostt = l
prio
t +Kt[mt −Mtl
prio
t −Ktut] = l
prio
t +Kk[mt −m
prio
t ] (21)
Kk = PkM
T
t [MtPkM
T
t + cv]
−1 (22)
The priori estimated error covariance Pk in the prediction step is used to update the Kalman
gain factor in (21) whereas Pk itself is updated by the a posteriori estimated error covariance.
The KF is used here based on the Matlab implementation, which delivers the optimum Kalman
gain (Kk) together with the steady state error covariance matrix (Pk).
For the system state estimation using the KF, the process and the measurement noise covariance
are determined. Since the system input is assumed to be unknown and the model uncertainty is
high, the process noise covariates are set to high values. The values for the measurement noise
covariance matrix will be determined a priori by the first estimation of the measurement error
mt − l
post
t , as given in (21). The overall process flow of the KF is illustrated in Fig. 5.
B. Sensor Signal Reconstruction Algorithm
If there is a sensor detected as faulty using Algorithm 2, the sensor signal reconstruction
algorithm (see Algorithm 3) is used by the neighboring sensor nodes. The basic idea of the
signal reconstruction is as follows. When a sensor signal does not correspond to the modeled
system (monitoring its location) and it was erroneously assumed that this signal has a low
measurements noise covariance, then the signals from the other sensors cannot be correctly
reconstructed, and the difference between the measured and estimated signals will be high. If
the value of the covariance for the faulty sensor signals is set as high, then the KF will reconstruct
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Algorithm 3: Sensor Signal Reconstruction
Step 1: Detect the faulty sensor by changes
of indicator λMInm (Algorithm 2)
Step 2: Recreate the state space model of the structure
w.r.t. the sensor location (including faulty or
nonexistent sensor) on the structure
[see M and K matrices in Eq. (6)]
Step 3: Determine the process and measurements noise
covariance matrices //(see Eq. (20))
Step 4: Set the covariance value(s) of the assumed
faulty sensor(s) to be high
Step 4: Solve the state space equation of motion through
KF with the estimated state vector lPostt (in signal
correction step). The KF is driven by the input
ut = 0 and the measured signals yit
all the signals, including the incorrect signals, with the help of the other signals and the model.
In this manner, it is possible to reconstruct more than one signal simultaneously. The number
of signals that can be reconstructed rely on the number of neighboring nodes in case of the
distributed system, all of the nodes in the network in case of the centralized system, and on the
quality of the model. For a better understanding of Algorithm 3, the procedure is broken into
several steps.
By means of Algorithm 3, when just one sensor node does not work properly, it is possible to
identify and reconstruct it only with the help of KF. For this purpose, Steps 2 to 5 are applied.
Here, Steps 3 to 5 have to be calculated several times. The number of loops over these steps
corresponds to the number of neighboring nodes in the case of the distributed WSN or all of
the nodes in the case of the centralized WSN. In each loop, the measurement variance of one
sensor is set to be high. In addition, we attempt to detect a missing sensor and construct its
signals that can be found in Appendix E.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Simulation Studies
1) Methodology: We conduct comprehensive simulations using MATLAB to evaluate DependSHM
that includes the faulty sensor detection methods and signal reconstruction algorithm. We use
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Fig. 6. Performance of different fault detection methods: achieved MII under sensor faults.
real data sets collected by the SHM system employed on the high-rise GNTVT [26] and a SHM
toolsuite [46]. We use the data sets for the 100-sensor case in our simulations. We perform the
WSN deployment via our WSN-based deployment scheme suggested in [13], which is supported
by the ACSM engineering deployment methods [16]. The simulation environment is a 450× 50
sensing field regarding structural environment, e.g., bridge, building, aircraft.
The background data is simulated as vibration influenced by the 100 sensor locations in the
field. A random Gaussian noise is added to all the data. The mean of the noises is zero, and
the standard deviation is 10% of the real signals. From the data sets, a set of data is used as
reference data to train the joint distribution, and another set of similar data is used for testing. A
random Gaussian noise is added to all the data. The mean of the noises is zero, and the standard
deviation is 10% of the real signals. From the data sets, a set of data is used as reference data to
train the joint distribution, and another set of similar data is used for testing. The noise is present
in both the data sets. Thus, the trained correlation model reflects the noises. In the distributed
detection method, each sensor makes a decision based on signals received from neighboring
nodes within Rmin. After a sensor receives a decision, it recomputes its MII and chooses to
change its decision accordingly. The energy cost and routing models described in Section 3 are
used for evaluation.
For comparison, we implement other three schemes, including SPEM [16] and NFMC [33].
We compare their performance with DependSHM. We consider two schemes for observing
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Fig. 7. Performance of different fault detection methods: the fault detection accuracy.
the performance of our fault detection and tolerance methods: i) distributed fault detection
under localized data processing (DependSHM); ii) centralized fault detection under localized
data processing (cSHM). SPEM is a WSN deployment method for SHM that nicely explains
CS requirements and is verified on the GNTVT. It adjusts the quality of sensor locations to
better fit WSN requirements. It is a centralized data processing method. We intend to verify its
performance under fault detection and tolerance support and compare with DependSHM. NFMC
is our preliminary fault detection and tolerance WSN-based SHM scheme, which is based on
the natural frequency extraction and matching.
Using simulation results, we compare DependSHM with them in several aspects under the
fault injections;: i) fault detection accuracy; ii) dependability in terms of detection ability and
mode shape (Φ) recovery, etc., and iii) energy cost of the WSN. Here, the detection ability is the
rate that is calculated by the percentage of successful faulty sensor detection to the percentage of
the amount of the sensor fault injection. This includes both the false positive and false negative
occurrences. Here, false positive cases are recorded as an undamaged location of the structure
is identified as a damaged location, and false negative cases are recorded as a damaged location
of the structure is identified as an undamaged location.
2) Results: In the first set of simulations, we implement all three schemes under the sensor
fault injection (through modifying a number of sensors’ signals randomly in the data sets).
A fraction of the sensor nodes is randomly selected and the modified faulty signals are fed
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Fig. 8. Observation on the actual mode shape curvature vs. mode shape curvature in cases of faulty sensors and recovery (signal
reconstruction).
into their acquisition modules. We vary the number of faulty sensors from 15% to 25%. Each
sensor node broadcasts its readings towards the neighboring sensor nodes. Each of the faulty
readings is replaced by a random number independently drawn from a uniform distribution in
the deployment field (0, 450). Fig. 6 shows MII achieved by the four schemes. Out of them,
DependSHM achieves the smallest value, followed by cSHM method. SPEM method performs
poorly, since it requires centralized data processing and shows a significant amount of data
packet loss during transmission. Due to heavy data losses, its performance on the MII is low.
Nevertheless, NFMC still outperforms SPEM in many sensor fault detection cases.
Fig. 7 depicts the fault detection accuracy, which is computed as accuracy = (true positive
+ true negative)/all. The detection accuracy in DependSHM is about 98%, which outperforms
others. In SPEM, the detection accuracy is poorer (less than 80%) than that of others, while it
is from 75% to 85% in NFMC. One major cause is that peak natural frequency signals used in
NFMC and DependSHM achieve higher MII. However, we experience that the fault detection
accuracy rate becomes lower in NFMC and SPEM than in DependSHM and cSHM, as the
number of faulty sensor nodes in the WSN increases.
Dependability Verification. We next observe the structural health condition using WSNs in
simulations. We estimate mode shape (Φ) curvature under sensor faults and the signal reconstruc-
tion of the faulty sensors. We recover the first Φ (see Fig. 8) of the simulated structure with 100
27
Fig. 9. Energy cost in different measures analyzed by five rounds of monitoring.
locations, which cover up to 450 meters of the structure. Φ is extracted, based on sensor collected
signals in DependSHM. We can see the impact on the health status, in which the actual mode
shape is distorted under the sensor faults, which is successfully recovered by the corresponding
sensor signals’ reconstruction. This implies that, if there is no appropriate faulty signal detection
and tolerance methods, having successful monitoring operations will be difficult to achieve. Thus,
a WSN-based SHM system without having such methods will not be dependable. More results
and analysis of the performance of WSN-based SHM system dependability in different schemes
can be found in Appendix F.
Energy Cost. We next observe the energy cost in the first five rounds of monitoring seen in Fig.
9 for DependSHM, cSHM, and SPEM schemes. We consider two cases: the amount of energy
cost in the case of normal monitoring operation when there is no fault injection in the WSN and
the WSN needs to provide health monitoring; the amount of energy cost in cases of monitoring
operations when there are the fault injection and recovery from the sensor faults through the
signal reconstruction. We calculate the energy cost for computation, transmission, and overhead
under both localized and centralized data processing. We did not consider the energy cost for
measurement, as we consider the same amount of energy cost for the measurement in all the
schemes. We can see that the amount of energy cost for communication in SPEM and cSHM is
very large compared to SPEM. The amount of energy cost in cSHM is seen to be around 60%
more than that of DependSHM, while it is 90% more than that of DependSHM.
28
Fig. 10. Global mode shape (Φ) curvatures based on each sensor individual frequencies in SPEM and DependSHM.
B. WSN Prototype System Implementation
1) Methodology and Wireless Sensor Platform: We validate our scheme by implementing a
proof-of-concept system using the TinyOS on Imote2 platforms [47]. Our main objective is to
verify i) the dependability and ii) the energy-efficiency of the system. We target the accuracy or
successful Φ identification, because it can provide us with the answer, whether or not a WSN-
based SHM system is dependable in terms of various sensor faults. We employ 10 integrated
Imote2s called SHM motes on a test structure (refer to Fig. G1 and Appendix G1 for more
detail); an additional Imote2 is located 15 meters away as the BS mote, and a PC as a command
center for the BS mote and data visualization. The test structure has 10 floors; at each floor, a
mote is deployed to monitor the structure’s horizontal accelerations. In the experiment, Rmin is
adjusted by the diameter of the structure, which is adjusted by estimating the height of the test
structure and each floor.
Fault Injection. To produce a sizable vibration response of the test structure, we collected
the original data by vertically exciting the test structure using a magnetic shaker. We inject
the sensor faults in two cases: i) debonding fault between the 5th sensor and the structure; ii)
precision degradation fault during acceleration signal capturing by the 10th sensor. The sensors
are expected to work properly but exhibit faulty acceleration measurements or decisions.
2) Experiment Results: In the first set of experiments, we compute mode shapes (Φ) in the
base-line structural system, when there are no damage events and no sensor faults. These are
computed by sensor initial identified natural frequency (presented in detail in Appendix G2). Fig.
10 demonstrates two mode shapes of the structure, captured by using the identified frequencies
in both SPEM and DependSHM schemes. The results compare the exact mode shapes obtained
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by centralized WSN where the motes transmit their measured signals to the BS. On the other
hand, in DependSHM, the final mode shapes provided by the each mote are combined at the
BS. The errors between two processes are analyzed. The accuracy of mode shapes identification
in SPEM is at least 13% lower than the accuracy in DependSHM. It is found that DependSHM
has around 16% better accuracy than that of SPEM under topology 2 (as shown in Fig. 3). The
global mode shape computed at the BS assembles all of the sensors’ final results. Note that in the
mode shape assembling, mode shapes from different motes correspond to the slight difference
in the set of natural frequencies.
Fig. 11a shows experimental fault detection results. Remarkable changes in signals of the 5th
and 10th sensors and some of their neighboring nodes are detected. The MII changes in both
of the sensor fault cases can be seen in Fig. 11b. Some of the neighboring nodes, e.g., 4th, 6th,
9th, and so on have also provided an extent of change in their MII. This is because their signals
have also been partially affected by the fault injection. The corrupted/faulty signals of a sensor
(e.g., the 5th) are reconstructed (details performance analysis on the signal reconstruction can
be found in Appendix G3).
The energy cost analysis of the experimental WSN is provided in Appendices G4. We find
that, in the case of faulty sensor detection and signal reconstruction, DependSHM consumes a
small amount of energy in computation with a slight overhead, which is 5% to 8% of the total
energy cost in each round, Meanwhile, it saves a significant amount of energy for communication
(which is at least three times when compared to its counterparts).
Dependability verification: Identification of what exactly happened in the structure.
When computing the mode shapes, we should notice that the signals of the faulty sensors
contribute to the global mode shape computation. Thus, the mode shape values corresponding to
the failed sensors are changed drastically. If there is a missing sensor, the mode shape result is
affected. Considering faulty signals, missing signals (in the case of sensor missing), or irregular
signals (may be due to the damage), the mode shapes will be affected. But we need to know
exactly what happened in a WSN-based SHM system so that we can realize whether WSN-based
SHM is dependable or not.
Now, we identify exactly what happened in the structure. Recall that there is a possibility
of both sensor fault and damage occurrence at the same location. If there is a change in the
signals with a single sensor only, the sensor may be faulty. If the change is present with multiple
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Fig. 11. (a) Distributed sensor fault detection (5th sensor and 10th sensor are faulty); (b) MII achieved by the two detection
methods under the sensor faults.
sensors, there is possibly damage. However, if there is damage, it cannot be identified before
the faulty sensor detection. As the fault injected, the 5th sensor should be faulty at a different
time. As shown in Fig. 12a, during the SHM operation, at Td =5, the 5th sensor is detected as
faulty, and at Td=20, the 10th sensor is detected as faulty. The changes in the mode shape are
computed at those time intervals.
We inject structural physical damage through removing the plates on the 5th and 10th floors,
since sensors located at these floors are faulty. They are not able to provide appropriate damaged
information. We can see in Fig. 12b that the neighbors (4th, 6th, and 9th ) are able to detect an
extent of changes (i.e., the presence of a damage) in the structure, where the slightly affected
mode shapes clearly appeared.
Under the same experiment and excitation setting, we further conduct experiments in which
a faulty sensor signal is reconstructed by using our algorithm. The mode shape’s curvature is
recovered significantly at the 10th sensor location, as shown in Fig. 12c. This means that there
is possibly a damage, since the mode shape is still slightly affected. However, the changes in
mode shape at the 5th sensor still remains and is slightly recovered at the neighbors. It provides
the correctness of DependSHM and the dependability in WSN-based monitoring. If there was
no recovery solution, the damage would not be identified and the changes at the sensor near the
faulty sensor would not be discovered, which is the exact opposite of the 5th sensor cases.
Further proof of the damage detection can be seen in Fig. 12d. Here, we replace the plate on
the same floors. When the sensors wakeup and start monitoring, that time Td=42. In Fig. 12d, no
remarkable change appears at the 10th sensor location. Distorted mode shape information at the
neighbor locations is completely recovered. We can say that no MII appeared. In contrast, at the
31
Fig. 12. The mode shape’s curvature under sensor faults and recovery from the faults.
5th location, mode shape remains unrecovered but there is no remarkable mode shape curvatures
at the neighbor sensors’ location. It proves that the 5th sensor is surely faulty, while there was
damage at the 10th sensor at this period of monitoring (but which is not clearly detected as the
prior damage).
Through an analysis, the quality of the faulty sensor signal reconstruction is about 92%
compared to the base-line results under the fault-free condition (as shown in Fig. 10, and TABLE
G1 in Appendix G). The inference can be drawn from the above analysis that, in the presence
of sensor faults, a damage can be successfully detected in DependSHM.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a dependable WSN-based SHM scheme, DependSHM, by making
the best use of resource-constrained WSNs for SHM and incorporating requirements of both
engineering and computer science domains. DependSHM includes two complementary algo-
rithms for sensor fault detection and faulty sensor’s signal reconstruction. It is able to provide
the quality of SHM in the presence of sensor faults automatically, which does not need any
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network maintenance for the fault detection and recovery, and does not consume significant WSN
resources for the recovery. In the future, we plan to study decentralized computing architectures
in WSNs, which can be integrated by the computing system issues and structural engineering
system techniques in conjunction. Such an architecture is highly expected to reduce data traffic
for data-intensive SHM and energy cost in WSNs.
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APPENDIX A
EXTENDED ENERGY COST MODEL (COST(ei ))
One of our important objectives is to minimize the energy cost of the network regarding various aspects, including
the sensor fault detection and recovery, damage event detection. Let cost(ei) denote the total energy cost of sensor
i, including measurement, computation, transmission, and overhead. The sensor i has discrete power level that it
can adjust it in ranges from Rmin to Rmax. In the beginning, sensor i adopts its minimum power level and then i
may dynamically increase it.
We describe here how energy consumed in transmitting a packet. The maximum energy cost of i depends on
the routing protocol used by the data collection application.
Consider a shortest path routing model [13], [16]; there is a path from sensor i to neighboring sensor node or
the BS j: q = z0, z1 . . . zk. Sensor i propagates the data to them. We can find the ith hop sensor on each path and
calculate the amount of traffic that passes along on the paths within each round of monitoring data collection (Td,
d=1,2,. . . , n). Then, the cost(ei) can be decomposed into the following four parts:
cost(ei) = eT + ecomp + esamp + eoh (A23)
We describe these terms in the following:
• eT is the total energy cost for data transmission in a round of data transmission over a link between a
transmitter and a receiver, where sensor i uses its power level from a minimum to a maximum, but not
beyond the maximum power. We use a standard energy cost model for calculating the packet transmission
cost [48].
• ecomp is the energy cost for processing data locally, e.g., computing equation (6) in Section 4.2. If a sensor is
allowed to transmit the raw vibration data to the BS directly, ecomp would be very low. The cost is mainly due
to the onboard processor, such as a micro-controller, DSP chip, or FPGA [49]. These devices consume energy
proportional to the number of processing cycles, as well as the maximum processor frequency f , switching
capacitance µ, and hardware specific constants k and β, respectively [49]. We focus on the number of cycles
taken for tasks, e.g., equation (6) and the amount of samples taken. The number of cycles required to perform
a task on the amount of samples (denoted by w) are estimated according to the computational complexity
O(w), which describes how many basic operations, i.e., averages, additions, multiplications, etc., must be
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Fig. B1. Based on acquired vibration signal characteristics, measured natural frequencies captured by sensor 1 and sensor 2
under manual input excitation on the structure, respectively. This shows the structural system oscillation (moving back and forth)
between its original state and its displaced state, captured by the two in their vicinity.
performed in executing the task. Given these parameters, the computational energy to complete a task can be
calculated according to:
ecomp = O(w) · µ(
f
k
+ β) (A24)
• esamp is the energy required for a sampling cost of M data points; when sensors capture vibration signals,
assuming a maximum 50% overlapping, M = (na/2+1/2) · cr, where na and cr are the number of averages
mainly for the purpose of noise reduction, that practically ranges from 10 to 20 and cross-correlation factor,
respectively [33], [43]. We assume that na and cr are set by fixed values on a sensor.
• eoh is any additional overhead for some causes, e.g., fault detection and signal reconstruction, copying data
to a local buffer, and network latency.
APPENDIX B
METHOD OF EXTRACTING LOCAL MODE SHAPE
In Section 4.2, we have described the state-space model for structural mode shape computation (Φ) at individual
sensor. Here, we show a method to local Φ extraction and explain benefits of utilizing the extracted Φ over f
towards sensor fault detection and tolerance.
Definition B1 [Natural Frequency]. Every structure has a tendency to vibrate with much larger amplitude at some
frequencies than others. Each such frequency is called a natural frequency denoted by f . f is an internal vibration
signal characteristic of structure, and is different for different structures (such as from building to bridge, from
indoor to outdoor). In other words, it is defined as the number of times that a structural system oscillates (moves
back and forth) between its original state and its displaced state when assuming there is no outside interference.
Definition B2 [Mode shape]. When subjected to external forces, the response of a structure is conceptually
similar to the response of a vibrating string or structural components such as a metal plate. Upon excitation, the
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Fig. B2. (a) The finite element model (FEM) of our designed physical infrastructure; (b) its original mode shape; (c)-(e) its
three mode shapes: mode 1, mode 2, and mode 3. FEM is a computer based numerical model often used for calculating the
behavior and strength of structural mechanics, such as vibration and displacement.
vibrations are a combination of several harmonics (or at a specific frequency of vibrations), known as modes. Each
mode deforms the structure into a particular spatio-temporal pattern known as a mode shape, denoted by Φ.
A. Local Mode Shape by Each Sensor
As the network modeled in Section 3.1, m sensors are available for deployment on a structure, and they extract
a total of p mode shapes from the measurement of m sensors. The corresponding natural frequencies and mode
shapes are represented, respectively, as follows:
f = [f1, f2, . . . , fp] (B1)
Φ =
[
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where fk(k = 1, . . . , p) is the kth natural frequency, Φk is the mode shape corresponding to fk · φki (i =
1, . . . ,m) is the value of Φk at the ith sensor. For example, Fig. B1 and Fig. B2 illustrate the first two sensors’
natural frequencies and corresponding mode shapes of a physical structure, receptively, which are extracted from
measurements of 10 deployed sensors in our prototype system. In the experiment, vertical accelerations at all the
given sensors are obtained, and 10% noise is added to all measurements. Under the artificial input excitation, the
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measured accelerations (the peak frequency pointed by 1, 2, . . .) at sensors 1 and sensor 2, respectively, refer to
Fig. B1 and Fig. B2 (which are obtained by using network topology in Fig. 3).
B. Φ over f in Sensor Fault Detection
The difference between f and Φ can be observed by comparing (C1) with (C2) and Fig. C1 with Fig. C2.
According to the ACSM theory, f is not suitable characteristic for damage event detection due to several reasons:
(i) f is not a sensitive indicator to damage event, where only severe damage event causes noticeable change on
the set of f ;
(ii) Due to the global property, f does not contain any spatial information, and thus localizing damage event is
difficult, while damage event detection using f is computationally inefficient;
(iii) High frequency modes are more susceptible to additional noise than low frequency modes; iv) f is susceptible
to additional noise [43]; To improve the usability of the f to detect damage event of small magnitude, high-
frequency modes, which are associated with local responses, may be used. However, we argue that adopting
f is not suitable for WSNs considering WSNs’ resource limitation;
(iv) Importantly, a large set of f is required to be sent to the BS (e.g., SPEM [16], NFMC [33]); damage event
detection is greatly affected if a portion of it is lost during transmission.
(v) Φ is directly linked to topology of the structure and Φ highly features the dynamics of the structure.
On the other hand, it can be seen from (C2) that Φ has elements corresponding to each sensor, thus containing
spatial information. Φ and its derivatives have been proven to be very sensitive features to detect damage event.
It takes into account out-of-frequency-bandwidth modes of the structure, and is also applicable to a complex
linear structure. This is why we target on Φ computation and observe the impact of sensor faults on Φ. However,
theoretically, Φ is a global parameter of a structure which means that, using sensor deployed on different locations
of a structure, the same set of Φ may not be obtained. To mitigate this problem, we allows each sensor estimate Φ
taking measurements about its vicinity (i.e., local structural response).
In this paper, we utilize the mode shape curvature method proposed by civil engineering to identify significant
change (i.e., damage event) in the mode shape [50]. The mode shape curvature has high sensitivity to damage event.
APPENDIX C
THE REASON OF NEGLECTING DAMPING
In Section 4.2, we have described the space-space model for the structural response measurements by sensors.
In (6), we have considered the matrices of mass and stiffness coefficients of the various elements of the structure,
but we have neglected the damping.
Damping is neglected in the model (6), considering individual sensor measurement estimation. In any case, (a)
faults in the sensors will only be identified if they cause changes in the response of a greater magnitude than the
errors in the estimated mode shape, and (b) the modes with low damping, having approximately real modes, will
be strongly excited. Thus, undamped mode shapes can be accurately estimated by (6) at each sensor.
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Fig. D. Graphical representation of the state-space equation based Kalman filter that is used in sensor’s faulty signal
reconstruction.
APPENDIX D
THE STATE-SPACE-EQUATION BASED KF FOR SIGNAL ANALYSIS
In Section 6, we proposed the Kalman filter (KF) technique for signal reconstruction. In this Appendix, a
graphical representation of the state-space equation based KF is presented in Fig. D. This equation is made with
the help of the state-space representation of the structural system, as described in Section 6.1. In Fig. D, ut is
the structural excitation at a specific frequency at time t. Mt and Kt are transition matrices. The signals σt−1
and σt represent the measurement noises, respectively. When measuring the responses of a dynamical structural
system by wireless sensors, the actual signals produced by the sensors are contaminated by noises due to internal
manufacturing defects, physical interference, or external environmental effects. According to features of the KF, we
assume that every measurement from the wireless sensors contains noises; thus, if the noise measurement is zero,
the KL collapses. Setting the mean of noise as zero is a common practice: E[σt] = 0. Noises are assumed to be
independent of each other, and are normally distributed with covariance matrices, cv = [σσT ]. The underlying KF
information is that KF is a recursive algorithm consisting of a loop, which is passed through for each time instant
t.
APPENDIX E
MISSING SENSOR DETECTION METHOD
In Section 5, we presented Algorithm 2 for faulty sensor detection. However, if a sensor is missing or is out of
service during the monitoring operation, if the sensor cannot be reached because of communication constraint or
failure, or there is an unknown reason, the algorithm cannot guarantee detection of such a sensor node. In order
to detect these sensors, we apply a method of Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL) [51] between the measured and
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Fig. E. Missing or failed node detection in a WSN-based system: (a) an example of MII change in the sensor signals; (b) the
detection result under the KL-KF.
estimated sensor signals and update Kalman filter (KF) with KL, which can be used as a fault indicator λKL−KFni
KL-KF (Kullback-Leibler-Kalman-Filter) for such sensors. Note that for a faulty sensor signal reconstruction, we
will use the Kalman filter (KL) technique.
The symmetrized form of the KL between the probability distributions of one measured signal (yi) at time t
and with the KF estimated signal yˆi is as follows:
KL =
1
2
∑
i
[pyi − pyˆi ]log2
pyi
pyˆi
(E1)
where pyi is the probabilities based on the number of points falling into the ith bin. When the KL between two
probability distributions is zero, the signals are identically distributed. The fault indicator is defined as:
λKL−KFp =
1
pmax − 1
pmax∑
p=1
KLp, 1 < p < pmax (E2)
If the faulty sensor p is not used for the estimation of the pmax sensor signals, then the KL distance between
the measured and estimated signals will be minimal; otherwise, the distance will be higher. This is shown under
the network topology in Fig. 3a. It can be seen in Fig. D that without sensor 5, the best estimation is possible,
which clearly indicates the sensor is faulty. This method based on KF is able to detect a missing or failed sensor.
Also, pure bias faults with the MII method are enhanced further by this KL-KF method. Thus, using KF-KL with
the help of Algorithm 2, it can be guaranteed to detect the fault types that produce faulty readings.
We illustrate the justification of sensor fault identification method based on MII (i.e., ω) through Algorithm 2.
In our real experiment, under the manual random excitation and 5th sensor removal, the 5th sensor is detected as
faulty. As shown in Fig. E(a), the relative change in MII indicates the sensor 5 as faulty. Actually, the sensor was
removed from the location, however, the sensor is detected as missing by λKL−KFp , as shown in Fig. E(b). To
guarantee a certain redundancy of information in each sensor data set, the initial frequency should be available for
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Fig. F1. Dependability verification: fault detection ability of different schemes.
identifying the faulty vibration signal. Therefore, if one of the neighboring nodes is missing, the KL-KF divergence
between the measured and estimated sensor signals can be used as a sensor fault indicator.
APPENDIX F
MORE RESULTS OF WSN-BASED SHM SYSTEM DEPENDABILITY
In Section 7.1.2, we have partly performed an analysis of the system dependability. In the analysis, we have
used a combination of true positive and true negative results in the sensor fault detection accuracy estimation. In
this Appendix, we continue the analysis of the performance of the system dependability. We particularly consider
the dependability of WSN-based SHM schemes as the ability of fault detection and the ability of structural health
event (damage) detection of the schemes.
At first, we discuss the detection ability of different WSN-based schemes. Fig. F1 demonstrates the fault detection
ability of DependSHM and other schemes. We can see that the detection ability of DependSHM is much better
than that of cSHM, NFMC, and SPEM. NFMC shows higher detection errors than DependSHM, even higher than
cSHM. Looking into details of causes, we summarize the following observations under the random fault injection:
(i) The same pick frequencies cannot be achieved in many neighborhoods or clusters in NFMC;
(ii) One or more clusters are disconnected from the network, as one or more faulty sensors are isolated based on
the natural frequency comparison (although it shows the good ability rate of fault detection in some clusters);
(iii) The scheme is limited to the frequency matching based fault detection;
(iv) NFMC fails to detect other types of faults;
(v) The fault detection ability of SPEM is very low, due to non-faulty reading losses that results in a increased
amount of faulty readings;
(vi) When attempting to recover from the faults, both SPEM and NFMC schemes require a significant amount of
energy cost.
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Fig. F2. Dependability verification: structural health event detection ability of different schemes.
We next examine the system dependability in terms of the structural health event detection ability of a system.
This can provide us an implication that how much a system can cope with sensor faults and what is the significance
of addressing dependability issue in a system. We gather all the false positive and false negative cases appeared in
the WSN-based SHM (achieved from a total of 50 simulation runs), and we get an average. Then, we calculate the
structural health event detection ability rate as 1-(false positive rates + false negative rates). The results is depicted
in Fig. F2. We also take into account the structural health monitoring under NO recovery (a preliminary analysis
has been done based on these results, as illustrated in Fig. 8). Here, we intend to find evidence that what exactly
happens when there is NO dependability option (fault detection and recovery) provided.
In Fig. F2, we can see the results, which shows that the structural event detection ability of DependSHM is
between 93% and 97.2%, which greatly outperforms others. In SPEM, the detection ability under recovery from
sensor faults tolerance algorithm is inferior (between 75% and 92%) among all of the schemes, while it is between
74% and 95% in NFMC and 87% to 95% in cSHM. There can be various reasons that SPEM provides poor
detection rate, including i) centralized decision making on the fault detection and tolerance (data losses on the
fly is a factor), ii) application-specific sensor deployment, iii) natural frequency matching problem, and so on. In
NFMC, the peak natural frequency signals used in the sensor fault detection and recovery, by which the actual
mode shape curvature slightly distorted. This lead to a lower MII that results in a lower structural event detection
ability. As it can be seen in Fig. F2, the structural event detection ability becomes lower in NFMC and SPEM than
in DependSHM and cSHM, as the number of faulty sensor nodes in the WSN increases.
From the results in Fig. F2, the structural event detection ability rate is around 65% in a system with NO recovery
from sensor faults. It may make us surprised that the monitoring operations in a WSN-based SHM can be often
meaningless if there is no dependability option provided. From a deep observation, we have found evidence that
faulty sensors can corrupt results of a health event in a structural system without being detected. We have seen that
measured signals introduced by some faulty sensors often identify its location as damaged (actually it is undamaged
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location). We also have found that some faulty sensor identify its location as undamaged (actually the location is
damaged). There are a large number of such wrong diagnoses (false positive and false negative) that lead to a
reduced structural event detection ability.
APPENDIX G
MORE DETAILS OF THE WSN PROTOTYPE SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
A. Extended Detail of the Experimental Setup
We validate DependSHM by implementing a proof-of-concept system using the TinyOS on Imote2 platforms
[47]. Our main objective is to verify i) the dependability and ii) the energy-efficiency of the system. We target the
accuracy or successful Φ identification, because it can provide us with the answer, whether or not a WSN-based
SHM system is dependable in terms of various sensor faults.
The Imote2 (IPR2400) is an advanced wireless sensor platform (off-the-shelf), offering sufficient processing
capability and communication resources to locally and continuously monitor vibration characteristics under intensive
conditions. Its main board combines a low power PXA271 XScale processor with an 802.15.4 radio (CC2420) and
an antenna using 2.4 GHz. The major limitation with it is the energy.
We employ 10 integrated Imote2s called SHM motes on a test structure, as shown in Fig. G1; an additional Imote2
is located 15 meters away as the BS mote, and a PC as a command center for the BS mote and data visualization.
The test structure has 10 floors; at each floor, a mote is deployed to monitor the structure’s horizontal accelerations.
Each mote runs a program (implemented in the nesC language) to process the acceleration data acquired from
on-board accelerometers. The BS receives the data packets from the sensors through wireless communication, and
relays the data to the PC over a USB cable. The PC commands and sets parameters for the network through BS.
Java and Matlab are used to calculate and visualize the whole structural health condition. In the experiment, Rmin
is adjusted by the diameter of the structure, which is adjusted by estimating the height of the test structure and
each floor. Imote2’s discrete levels of range are set to use Rmin and Rmax.
B. Sensor Identified Natural Frequencies
In Section 7.2.2, we have given experimental mode shapes, estimated based on natural frequencies. In the first set
of experiments, we compute the natural frequencies, as shown in TABLE G1. These frequencies are used in creating
mode shapes (Φ) in the base-line structural system, when there are no damage events and no sensor faults. Note that
such a base-line mode shape should be not fixed but should be dynamic, i.e., a WSN-based SHM system can be
enabled to adapt or update its base-line mode shape, taking into account dynamic environments and environmental
noise factors. We find that the MII in different frequencies identified at different sensors is low (the result has been
shown in Fig. 11).
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Fig. G1. (a) The SHM mote integrated by Imote2; (b) twelve-story test structure and the placement of 10 SHM motes on it;
(c) their deployment.
TABLE G1
IDENTIFIED NATURAL FREQUENCIES BY THE FIRST FIVE SENSORS OF THE EXPERIMENTAL WSN IN SPEM AND
DEPENDSHM.
 
Mode 
Frequencies (Hz)  
Centralized processing (SPEM)  Localized processing (DependSHM) 
            
1 13.211 12.213 14.131 15.123 13.435  14.134 13.141 15.312 16.856 14.355 
2 17.341 14.798 15.112 16.234 15.141  17.741 15.141 17.214 17.852 16.641 
3 20.834 21.334 19.134 21.434 19.746  21.341 22.932 21.341 22.344 21.341 
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5
C. Signal Reconstruction at a Faulty Sensor
In Section 7.2.2, we have also provided the sensor fault detection results, where we have found that sensor 5 is
faulty. In order to the support the results, we hereby can observe the faulty signal reconstruction of the 5th sensor,
as shown in Fig. G2. The drift in the measured signal (red line) is corrected by the estimated signal (green lines).
We observe the mutual independence under the fault injection at the 5th sensor. In DependSHM, when sensor nodes
process data locally, the small value in the MII is achieved, ranging from 2% to 4%, and they are not considered
faulty. The MII provides the best value, when there is a remarkable change in the sensor measured signals, i.e., the
5th sensor and 10th sensor are faulty. This reveals that there can a better accuracy of fault detection in DependSHM
in practice, compared to others.
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Fig. G2. Signal reconstruction of the 5th sensor (that is detected faulty).
0 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40
DependSHM
cSHM
NFMC
SPEM
Energy cost (mAh)
Measurement
Computation
Transmission
Overhead
Fig. G3. The performance on the energy cost of the WSN in different schemes.
D. Energy Cost (cost(ei))
Due to space limitation, we have not presented the performance of energy cost of the WSN in Section 7.2.2,
which we present in this Appendix.
We allow all of the sensors to sleep after each monitoring period to perform power management. The TinyOS
2.0 drivers for the Imote2 supports putting all of the hardware to sleep when it is switched off. This is obvious
for a WSN-based SHM system, since a WSN does not always need to run actively in case of specific structural
event monitoring. For example, in case of aerospace vehicle monitoring, when it is not flying, the WSN may not
need monitoring operations. In another case, the WSN can be scheduled to run periodically or a part of the sensors
can be scheduled to wake up periodically and check health event status. cost(ei) is calculated by the energy cost
for computation, transmission, measurement, and overhead, where the overhead statistics with current cost data is
combined. The data sheet can be found in [47].
Fig. G3 shows the energy cost of a round of monitoring, Td=1. The DependSHM method significantly decreases
the energy cost compared to SPEM, from 0.197 mAh to 0.072 mAh. The reason is that the major energy is consumed
by the raw signal transmissions to the BS. The actual computation cost in DependSHM is 0.0072 mAh to execute
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Fig. G4. The performance on the energy cost of the WSN in the first five round of monitoring in DependSHM and NFMC.
the basic equations and fault detection and signal reconstitution. However, it fully depends on the number of cycles
that a sensor CPU requires. It also varies from sensor to sensor based on the tasks a needs to do. A sensor does
not need computation for signal reconstruction if there is not fault. In such a case, a sensor can save an average
of 0.0027 mAh. More importantly, in DependSys, the computation saves the Imote2 an average of 0.165 mAh
during transmission, since it reduces the time that the CC2420 radio is active. The overhead is caused by end-to-
end transmission delay and writing/reading data to/from Imote2’s memory, since we depend on local processing. In
both SPEM and NFMC methods, transmitting a large amount of raw data in each Td (i.e., transmission of natural
frequency sets and frequent retransmissions caused by packet losses) increases cost(ei). However, NFMC achieves
slightly lower energy cost for transmission than SPEM.
Further performance analysis of cost(ei) in five rounds of monitoring (Td, d = 1, ..., 5) can be seen in Fig. G4.
This shows the actual amount of energy cost required in DependSHM. We can see that DependSHM outperforms
NFMC significantly because of the above causes, cluster maintenance, and network maintenance (e.g., faulty sensor
isolation), particularly the set of mode shapes transmitted from the cluster-head to the BS. This is because the final
mode shapes of each cluster is transmitted by each cluster-head, while SPEM requires transmission of all natural
frequency sets. In our distributed solution, there is no frequent retransmission and the final mode shapes transmitted
by each sensor are without sensor fault information. In the case of faulty sensor detection and signal reconstruction,
the system consumes a small amount of energy in computation with a slight overhead, which is 5% to 8% of the
total energy cost in each round.
In a concluding remark about the results we have found and presented in this paper, our proposed dependable,
distributed SHM solution outperforms centralized solution almost in all aspects, including, energy cost of the WSN
and offering monitoring system dependability.
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